Probability Risk Identification Based Intrusion Detection System for
  SCADA Systems by Marsden, Thomas et al.
 Probability Risk Identification Based Intrusion 
Detection System for SCADA Systems 
 
Thomas Marsden, Nour Moustafa, Elena Sitnikova, and Gideon Creech 
 
School of Engineering and Information Technology, UNSW Canberra, Australia 
thomas.marsden@defence.gov.au,nour.moustafa@unsw.edu.au,e.sitnikova@adfa. 
edu.au,g.creech@adfa.edu.au 
 
Abstract. As Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys- 
tems control several critical infrastructures, they have connected to 
the internet. Consequently, SCADA systems face different sophisticated 
types of cyber adversaries. This paper suggests a Probability Risk Identi- 
fication based Intrusion Detection System (PRI-IDS) technique based on 
analysing network traffic of Modbus TCP/IP for identifying replay at- 
tacks. It is acknowledged that Modbus TCP is usually vulnerable due to 
its unauthenticated and unencrypted nature. Our technique is evaluated 
using a simulation environment by configuring a testbed, which is a cus- 
tom SCADA network that is cheap, accurate and scalable. The testbed 
is exploited when testing the IDS by sending individual packets from 
an attacker located on the same LAN as the Modbus master and slave. 
The experimental results demonstrated that the proposed technique can 
effectively and efficiently recognise replay attacks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Research into the security of SCADA systems has grown in recent years, as the 
potential damage to critical infrastructure including gas, electricity, water, traf- 
fic and railway, and/or loss of life and subsequent risk to state security have been 
realised [19]. SCADA refers to a system of computers and programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) that control and monitor industrial plants, processes and 
machinery [19, 11]. It enables technicians and engineers to supervise and take 
control of systems remotely [25]. SCADA is commonly employed in systems that 
are considered critical infrastructure, essential services, in which society re- lies 
on in day to day life. More specifically, critical infrastructure is defined by TISN 
as “Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks, which if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable 
for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic well- 
being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and 
ensure national security” [7, 27]. Unfortunately, most studies have unveiled that 
security is an afterthought at best in SCADA systems [19]. Various steps taken 
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to mediate the weaknesses have been suggested and are discussed in section 2. 
We suggest the implementation of an IDS [24, 23]. Commonplace in traditional 
information technology networks, IDSs are deployed to alert a systems adminis- 
trator when malicious activity is detected on their network [10]. However, their 
adoption in SCADA networks has been limited due to a lack of security best 
practice [15]. 
Replay attacks are network based attacks where valid data is repeated at a 
target to cause malicious effect. They are executed by a MitM or intended source, 
and due to the unencrypted and unauthenticated norm of Modbus TCP, replay 
attacks are highly effective in exploiting SCADA as these attacks attempt to 
disrupt the flow of traffic between source and destination [19]. The unencrypted 
nature permits a replay attack to modify the contents of a Modbus TCP packet 
[12]. This would manifest itself as modifying values stored in registers, for ex- 
ample if a traffic authority were to take manual control of a set of traffic lights 
in an accident, a packet directing red lights to ’turn on’ could be changed to say 
’turn off’ or never arrive at all [11]. The unauthenticated nature of Modbus TCP 
means that any user on the same LAN as a Modbus slave is able to access 
memory values of the PLCs and write values to create similar effects [11]. 
In this study, we suggest a Probability Risk Identification-based (PRI-IDS) 
for the Modbus TCP protocol named BusNIDS, with the aim of detecting replay 
attacks. It will achieve this through characterising data with pre-determined risk 
values, caching periods of data and generating risk values for those cached pe- 
riods. Caches with risk levels outside of one standard deviation as a threshold 
from the mean are flagged as potential replay attacks. All information collected 
from packets is available as header information from the Application Data Unit 
(ADU) and Protocol Data Unit (PDU), this means that we can deploy this tech- 
nique in realtime on an encrypted network [9]. A small scale industrial control 
network detailed in section 4, used for running attacks and testing the IDS and 
obtaining results comparing with three peer IDS techniques. 
 
The key contributions in this paper are summarised as follows: 
– We develop a Modbus TCP IDS that can conduct packet analysis and detect 
replay attacks. 
– We develop a SCADA testbed which is low-cost and simple to configure for 
evaluating the proposed IDS. 
– We compare the performance of the proposed technique with three existing 
techniques, showing its superiority. 
 
 
2 Background and Literature Review 
 
This section explains the background and previous studies related to the Modbus 
TCP protocol, IDS for SCADA systems, establishing testbeds for the purpose of 
IDS research and provides a contextualised review based on aims of the research. 
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SCADA systems feature a number of security challenges. Bartman et al. [5] 
describe SCADA networks with nine primary threat vectors. They are replay 
attacks, MitM, brute force, dictionary, eavesdropping, Denial of Service (DoS), 
war dialling, default credentials and data modification. They establish that im- 
plementing IPsec to transport data, AES encryption natively implemented into 
SCADA protocols and the use of IDSs reporting to a centralised Security Infor- 
mation and Event Management (SIEM) are three of the most effective methods 
to secure a SCADA network [5]. We discuss that the implementation of an IDS 
that analyses Modbus TCP header data to detect risks, and as such can improve 
the security posture of a system by working in tandem with encryption [9]. 
A review of current literature regarding IDS solutions that support Modbus 
TCP is required to form a baseline knowledge and assists in revealing where nov- 
elties  for  IDS  research  lay.  Yu¨ksel  et  al.  [30]  develop  an  anomaly  based  engine 
that they test utilising Modbus TCP, Modbus RTU and Siemens S7 datasets. The 
anomaly based engine is analysing individual TCP packets, determining   a 
probability that the packet is normal traffic based on features of the packet 
(Source IP, Destination IP, Functions Codes, Read/Write values, etc). Packets 
with probability deviation beyond a set limit are categorised as threats and gen- 
erate an alert. The engine is trained faster than existing  datasets and is able  to 
detect malicious traffic faster by a factor of 30% over its closest competitor. The 
trade off for these results is that when using live data rather than a pre- recorded 
dataset, each packet takes 0.7ms to parse [30]. Additionally, deploying the 
technique is limited in scope, as payload data is potentially encrypted and data 
available to the engine is limited. We demonstrate that through the inclu- sion 
of packet analysis and Modbus TCP session analysis, that a Modbus TCP IDS 
provides an improvement to the detection of malformed packets and replay 
attacks over existing algorithms trained using machine learning datasets. 
Research in the SCADA field has been invested into developing accurate 
testbed systems at reduced cost [2]. Ahmed et al. [1] developed a SCADA sys- 
tem testbed for cybersecurity and forensic research which models a gas pipeline, 
wastewater treatment plant and power distribution centre. Each plant is mod- 
elled using a different brand of in-service PLC, and thus a separate protocol from 
each plant to a centralised HMI. Due to the testbed utilising currently employed 
protocols and hardware, vulnerabilities discovered in it are likely to be repro- 
duced in deployed systems [1]. An alternative approach is suggested by Morris et 
al. [2]. The research showed that a completely simulated and virtualised system 
could compare in accuracy of control and reception of data to a physical system. 
Genge et al. [13] propose a hybrid simulation and emulation framework. PLCs 
and HMIs are emulated on the Emulab platform, allowing for virtual remapping 
of physical hardware. The distinct advantage of this method is that it allows for 
rapid expansion of a system, i.e., 100s of PLCs can be stood up rapidly in the 
system [13]. The authors showed that a physical test network has the attraction 
of being cheap, accessible and accurate. However, it does not demonstrate the 
same scalability as virtualised alternatives. 
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There are multiple pieces of research dedicated to datasets for the testing of 
IDSs. Morris et al. [22] have created datasets for a laboratory gas pipeline and wa- 
ter storage tank. Lemay et al. [18] take the view that the current datasets are too 
limited and are slanted towards the detection of malformed packets. Thus, they 
devise a set of network data that includes normal operation, operator manipula- 
tion, Metasploit exploits, unauthorised remote read/write commands, network 
scanning and exploitation of their covert Modbus TCP channel for command 
and control (C2) [18]. They simulated a small electrical network as a plant. The 
datasets provided by Lemay et al. [18] are publicly available and well rounded. 
The authors tested the Modbus TCP IDS with individual malicious commands 
interceding normal network operation. 
 
 
3 Probability Risk Identification (PRI-IDS) Technique 
The PRI-IDS technique is designed based on computing a risk level for network 
data. The following process is summarised as a flowchart in Figure 1 that demon- 
strates how our technique works for detecting abnormal events from SCADA 
data. 
 
Fig. 1. Flowchart summarising the PRI-IDS technique 
 
 
More importantly, we assign a base risk probability, RP (Risk value of a 
packet), to each packet depending on its function code according to Table 1. The 
risk values assigned to each function code are dependant on the potential effect 
that the function code has on the system and can be changed depending on the 
environment that the IDS is deployed in. Each risk value  is assigned    in real-
time as packets are processed. The RP value is increased an additional amount 
if the packet is identified as erroneous. The magnitude of risk values are 
dependent on the system in which the IDS is configured. As there are few cases 
in which the traffic light system should see write requests, these packets are 
more heavily weighted. 
A configurable number of packets (CACHE MAX SIZE) are appended to a 
cache. The average risk probability value for the cache is calculated as RC (Risk 
value  of a cache). Once the cache reaches CACHE MAX SIZE, the risk value  for 
that cache is stored and used to calculate a moving average, RA (Moving average 
risk). The cache is cleared and progressively filled to its maximum size. 
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At every cache update, the RC values are checked. Values which fall greater 
than 1σ (Standard deviation, which is a threshold of identifying malicious events) 
from the mean PRC are flagged as potential replay attacks. The corresponding 
packets which were cause for the deviation are also flagged and made available 
to the operator. Caches which cause flags to be raised are stored to file in .PCAP 
formats for further analysis and added as a stored cache. On cache updates, the 
current cache is also checked against stored caches for matches in packet risk 
data. 
 
Table 1. Risk Allocation for Modbus Function Codes 
 
Function type 
 Function name 
Function 
Risk 
code 
Data Access 
Bit 
access 
Physical Discrete 
Read Discrete Inputs 2 
Inputs 
Internal Bits or 
Read Coils 1
 
Physical Coils 
Write Single Coil 5 
Write Multiple Coils 15 
Physical Input 
Read Input Registers 4 
Registers 
Internal Registers 
Read Multiple
 
or Physical 
Holding Registers
 3
 
Output Registers 
Write Single
 6
 
Holding Register 
Write Multiple
 16
 
Holding Registers 
Read/Write
 23
 
Multiple Registers 
Mask Write Register 22 
Read FIFO Queue 24 
 
Read File Record 20 
 
Write File Record 21 
0.1 
  0.5 
  0.9 
  0.9 
 16-bit 
access 
0.1 
  
0.5 
  
0.9 
  
0.9 
  
0.9 
  0.5 
  0.1 
 File  
 Record 0.1 
 Access  
  0.5 
 
 
 
 
4 Testbed and implementing proposed PRI-IDS technique 
 
The testbed developed to run as a Modbus TCP network has three primary com- 
ponents. These components are the Raspberry Pi (RPi) running the openPLC 
software, traffic light program running on the PLC with a physical traffic light 
circuit interfacing via the RPi General Purpose Input Output (GPIO) pins, and 
a Windows 10 laptop running as a SCADA master via ScadaBR. 
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Fig. 2. Diagram of components in the SCADA testbed. Assembled using icon sets 
available at [16] 
 
 
The openPLC software runs on multiple platforms as an effort to build a 
standardised open source PLC solution [3]. The software can be compiled on  a 
RPi and achieves similar robustness to that of a commercial PLC [21]. At 
default, openPLC on the RPi operates with a 50ms scan rate, suitable for gas, 
water and traffic control SCADA applications [21]. Programs can be uploaded 
to the PLC through a local web interface. In addition to openPLC, the RPi runs 
the current iteration of the IDS. The openPLC was programmed with ladder 
logic to create a simple timer based traffic light program [8]. 
Fixed memory addresses in the PLC can be accessed via the GPIO pins on the 
RPi. A traffic light program and accompanying circuit have been constructed as 
a technique to visualise the effect of replay attacks on the PLC. For example, an 
attacker can intercept a valid write coils command and replay it at a later time, 
changing the intended state of the traffic lights [20]. In the physical circuit and 
HMI, this would present itself as changing the currently active light or disabling 
them completely. Figure 3 details the physical construction of the field device. 
ScadaBR was used as a Modbus master and HMI, accessible via a web in- 
terface hosted by the Apache web-server. The laptop used to operate ScadaBR 
ran Windows 10 with an Intel Core i5-6200U at 2.3GHz and 8192MB of DDR4 
RAM. ScadaBR is a fully-fledged SCADA master that supports multiple proto- 
cols, PLCs, sensors and custom HMIs [29]. 
The IDS is built in Python 2.7. There are a number of advantages to develop- 
ing with Python 2.7. The interpreted nature of Python 2.7 enables live testing of 
code. Commands can be run individually in the interpreter before implementing 
them into a full script [28]. The Scapy framework is natively built for Python 
2.7 and enables full network stack packet reading, writing and sniffing. 
The Modbus TCP extension for Scapy enables the author to view packets  in 
terms of Modbus commands rather than hexadecimal data dumps. It is a pivotal 
tool in the development of the IDS and for testing. It will be used for packet 
forging to test the IDS [6]. The IDS operates locally on the PLC due     to Linux 
support for Scapy framework being more stable than alternatives. It reports 
when malformed Modbus TCP packets are sent to the PLC. 
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Fig. 3. Traffic light circuit connected 
to RPi PLC via GPIO 
Fig. 4. Circuit diagram of traffic light 
and RPi PLC connections 
 
5 Experimentation and Discussion 
 
5.1 Dataset used for experimentation 
 
A simulated attacker is used to test the IDS through a collection of Scapy com- 
mands that transmit Modbus TCP packets. These packets are considered the 
dataset that is used to evaluate the IDS and are sent directly to the PLC. Pack- 
ets in the dataset are classified as either normal or attack packets. To generate 
the dataset commands, standard operational traffic between the SCADA master 
and slave was recorded. The operational traffic featured reading addresses from 
the PLC, and a write to the PLC to simulate manual override of the system. The 
traffic was converted to equivalent Scapy commands for repeatability and attacks 
were added. The malicious commands simulate replay attacks and change the 
state of coils that are actively used in the system in an unauthorised manner. 
 
5.2 Evaluation metrics and testbed description 
 
The IDS is characterised by the metrics accuracy, Detection Rate (DR) and False 
Positive Rate (FPR). Each of the metrics rely on the state of packets passed 
through the IDS, these states are defined as the terms true positive (TP), true 
negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). A packet is classified 
as TP if it is an attack packet that is correctly identified and thus, TP is the total 
number of TP classified packets. TN is the total number of packets that the IDS 
correctly classifies as normal traffic. FP refers to the number of packets that are 
normal however were classified as attacks by the IDS. FN is the number of attack 
packets that the IDS incorrectly classifies as normal traffic [24, 23]. The IDS 
metrics are calculated as functions of these terms according to equations 1, 
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2 and 3 below. 
 
 
Accuracy = 
 
T P + T N 
 
  
T P + T N + F P + F N 
T P 
 
(1) 
DetectionRate =    
T P + F N 
F P 
(2) 
F alseP ositiveRate =    
F P + T N 
(3) 
In addition to testing the performance of the IDS, the performance of the 
Modbus TCP testbed is also considered. The testbed network was operated for 
a period of 1 hour. Every 10 minutes, write requests to the PLC were made and 
values in memory were altered. When write requests weren’t being made, the 
PLC was being continuously polled with read requests. 
 
 
Table 2. Errors in Modbus TCP traffic over the testbed for 88125 polls. 
 
Polls OK Errors Error % 
88125 88119 5 0.0057 
 
 
Over the hour, the testbed provided a high level of accuracy. Table 2 displays 
the errors in Modbus TCP traffic on the testbed over an hour time period. 
 
5.3 Algorithm performance compared with three techniques 
 
The performance of proposed algorithm technique was assessed in terms of the 
overall detection rate and false positive rate, listed in Table 3 and shown in 
Figure 5. It is clear that our algorithm achieves the highest DR with roundly 
83.7% and the lowest FPR with about 15.3% compared with the techniques [14] 
of K-Nearest Neighbour, Na¨ ıve Bayes and Random Forest . Performance of the 
alternative techniques used results generated by Hassan et al with technique 
parameters tuned according to their work.[14] 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of IDS algorithm performances 
 
Technique DR FPR 
K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) [14] 55.3% 44.8% 
Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) [14] 44.4% 52.6% 
Random Forests (RF) [14] 60.5% 38.4% 
Probability Risk Identification (PRI) 83.7% 15.3% 
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Fig. 5. Comparing performances of four IDS techniques 
 
 
The evaluation criteria for machine learning algorithms in IDSs are DR and 
FPR. Clearly, the results for DR and FPR are improvements over the compet- 
ing techniques shown in Table 3 and discussed in Hassan’s work. The PRI-IDS 
produces improved results over the competing algorithms for Modbus TCP due 
to the customisable risk assignment to individual packets, depending on the po- 
tential process of each technique being used for testing. In more details, the K-
Nearest Neighbour technique applies a majority vote function between neigh- 
bour data points, but as there is relatively a similarity between normal and 
abnormal data, it cannot achieve better than the PRI-IDS while running in re- 
alistic testbed environment [26]. Similarly, the Na¨ ıve Bayes and Random Forest 
techniques cannot find a clear difference between abnormal and normal observa- 
tion of SCADA data [4, 17]. 
Ultimately, The PRI-IDS computes the probability of network observations 
with an accumulating likelihood for prior information, and this finds clear devi- 
ations between legitimate and suspicious observations compared with the three 
techniques. It means that clear distinction can be made between what is desir- 
able and undesirable traffic at the packet level. However, the detection algorithm 
is susceptible to long, sustained attacks where an attacker transmits packets at 
a rate that builds the moving average up to a high risk level, allowing high risk 
packets to be sent without triggering a detection. 
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6 Conclusion 
We discussed a Modbus TCP PRI-IDS capable of detecting replay attacks pas- 
sively at a 28.4% better rate than the next best algorithm, Random Forest,  and 
a corresponding testbed that is cheap, accurate and scalable. Ultimately, we 
developed an IDS technique designed to detect replay attacks that is more 
desirable to implement within a Modbus TCP network than alternatives. The 
PRI-IDS is written in Python 2.7 and relies on the Scapy network packet manip- 
ulation framework. The project is relevant due to the growth in Modbus TCP for 
communcations within SCADA networks. Additionally, the fragility of many 
SCADA systems means that implementing a passive solution into a network is 
often preferred over an active or in-line solution. In future work, we will imple- 
ment the PRI technique into a machine learning environment to test it directly 
with existing SCADA IDS datasets to determine its performance. It will provide 
a known and widely used benchmark to test against and will enable fine-tuning 
of the technique. Once the PRI technique is fine-tuned, it will be reimplemented 
into a real-time environment to show the increase in performance against the 
initial iteration of the technique in an IDS. 
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